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Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked university and professional military education
students to participate in our third annual student writing contest by sending us their thoughts on
strategy.
Now, we are pleased to present an essay selected for honorable mentions by Justin Hauffe from
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.
It was as if the words of the great Latin American poet, Pablo Neruda, were true: the ghost
of El Gran Libertador, Simón Bolívar, had returned. This sentiment was alive in the hearts of
many Venezuelans, and the barrios of Caracas were electrified with revolutionary hope and
passion in February of 1999, as Hugo Chavez took the dais of Congress to be sworn in as the
new president of Venezuela. The charisma and forcefulness of this new self-proclaimed
Bolivarian leader had swept over Venezuela in a frenzied and powerful cult of personality
that had striking similarities to Fidel Castro's influence on Cuba in 1959. While Chavez was
taking over the country with the largest proven oil reserves in the world, the U.S. was in a
daze as the Senate acquitted President Bill Clinton on two articles of impeachment.[1]
However, if Chavez did not capture U.S. interest in the 1990s, then he certainly would in the
2000s by selling oil to Cuba, making petroleum business alliances with Saddam Hussein and
Muammar el-Qaddafi, supporting Colombian rebels, threatening gas prices across all of the
U.S., and openly calling President George W. Bush "el Diablo"(the Devil), at the U.N. general
assembly.[2] Analysis of U.S. foreign policy toward Venezuela through both the Clinton and
subsequent administration of President George W. Bush reveals a type of non-committal
waffling in backing the opposition to leftist Venezuelan administrations that yielded neither
a decisive change in Venezuelan policy nor a significant benefit to U.S. interests, but rather
irreparably damaged U.S.-Venezuelan relations and inspired provocative behavior by
Chavez.
The type of Venezuelan neoliberalism that aligned with U.S. values was already in decline
when Clinton took office in 1993. During the early 1990s, the political backlash from the
Venezuelan government’s violent handling of Caracazo—a wave of nation-wide protest and
riots against price hikes to public services caused by neoliberal economic reforms—cast a
shadow over the administration of Venezuelan president, Carlos Andrés Pérez.[3] Despite
this unrest, Pérez enabled the privatization of many major state-run Venezuelan industries
and companies that had previously faced bankruptcy under government control.[4] Pérez
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Raphael Caldera , President of
venezuela, during his second
term. (Reuters)
also passed a series of reforms intended to strengthen the connection local communities
made to individual candidates.[5] Prior to Pérez’s reforms, the electorate only voted on a
political party—individuals did not see the name of the actual human candidate on the
ballot.[6] Pérez changed this policy by making it possible for voters to see the name of the
person they were electing.[7] To the detriment of his own administration, the overall effect
of Perez’s reforms in the early 1990s was to weaken the power of the central government
and increase the ire of the political and working-class Venezuelans who had benefited from
publicly controlled industry.[8] Pérez had unintentionally placed his government in a
precarious position and made the conditions in Venezuela ripe for revolution, which came
in the form of then Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez’s failed coup attempt in 1992.
The Clinton
administration took
office in 1993, the
year following
Chavez’s failed coup,





both pre- and post-Chavez Venezuela. From 1993 until Chavez's victorious election in 1998,
Venezuelan oil production rose steadily, and the U.S. was the largest consumer of this
staple Venezuelan export.[9] In other words, the U.S. and Venezuela had a symbiotic
economic relationship. This relationship was reinforced in 1997 when Clinton visited
Caracas in hopes of establishing a hemispheric free-trade zone.[10] At the time this meeting
occurred, Venezuela was still reeling from the collapse of its banking system in 1994, and
the country had been leaning to the political left since the election of the explicitly anti-
neoliberal president, Rafael Caldera, in 1993.[11] However, the evidence seems to indicate
that the meeting between the two heads of states was amicable and productive. At the
conclusion of the meeting, both leaders renewed commitments to seek a hemispheric free-
trade zone by 2005, promote human rights, collaborate to counter criminal and terrorist
threats abroad, and cooperate on weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation efforts.
[12]
There is even evidence that the Clinton administration wanted to maintain a relationship
with Venezuela after the election of Chavez, as was evident in 1999 when the two countries
collaborated on taxation laws to avoid double taxation and deter fiscal evasion.[13] While it
could be argued that this last example, tax law, was a vestigial remnant of a project worked
on prior to the election of Chavez—it was signed in Caracas just days before Chavez took
office and Clinton pushed it to the Senate for approval in June of 1999—it still represented a
willingness by the Clinton administration to continue the progress made between the U.S.
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Orlando Castro-Llanes with President Bill Clinton (Alchetron)
and Venezuela.[14] In the opening months of his administration, Chavez also seemed open
to pragmatic dealings with capitalist markets and the U.S. as a whole.[15] Perhaps the best
symbolic representation of Chavez’s own willingness to cooperate with a capitalist
government was when he rang the closing bell at the New York Stock Exchange in 1999.[16]
Despite Chavez’s opposition to the aforementioned hemispheric free-trade zones, the U.S.
and Venezuela would maintain a cautious but relatively cordial relationship during what was
called Chavez’s “Moderate Stage” from 1999 until November of 2001.[17] 
While this evidence
suggests that Clinton
wanted to continue a
relationship with
Venezuela after the
election of Chavez, his
objectives could have











illegal Venezuelan contributions to the 1992 Clinton campaign had on the Clinton
administration and why the Department of Justice failed to prosecute the case.[18] The
contributions in question were linked to Orlando Castro-Llanes, a prominent Cuban-born
Venezuelan banker and convicted money-launderer.[19] Castro-Llanes had previously been
in charge of one of the largest banks in Venezuela, El Banco de Venezuela.[20] However,
when the Venezuelan banking system collapsed in 1994, Castro-Llanes fled to the U.S. to
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avoid charges of bank fraud in Venezuela.[21] While it could be argued that this
Congressional investigation was largely a political tool to weaken the Democratic president
—the congressional transcript is rife with accusatory and partisan language—this argument
does not negate the fact that there was a link that could be made between President Clinton
and Castro-Llanes.[22] It would not have been difficult for Chavez, who was highly
influenced by the writings of Karl Marx and other left-wing thinkers, to use Castro’s
connection to the U.S. president as evidence in his own mind that the Clinton
administration’s relative amicability was a front for its true underlying support for the
corrupt old guard of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie that Chavez fought to overthrow.[23] In
other words, a paradox existed between the Clinton administration’s desire for cooperation
with a leftist Venezuelan administration and links Clinton had to the Venezuelan right.
Suspicions Chavez had of the U.S. government were almost immediately manifested as the
Bush administration took control of the White House in 2001. Chavez’s period of political
moderation came to an abrupt halt in November of 2001, as he enacted 49 laws with the
intention of reversing neoliberal reform trends of the 1990s.[24] Shortly thereafter, in April
of 2002, growing dissatisfaction with Chavez's management of the state-run oil company,
Petróleos de Venezuela, caused the labor unions to organize a general strike.[25] This strike
was followed by a successful coup to eject Chavez from office, but it was a short-lived affair
that was quickly undone by counter-coup military forces.[26] Forty-eight hours after being
removed from office, Chavez returned to Miraflores, the presidential office building, and
resumed control.[27] The Bush administration’s reaction to the coup was cold, as it blamed
Chavez’s oppressive methods for the outbreak of violence and offered no conciliatory
remarks. [28] The Bush administration’s stance on the coup stood in stark contrast to the
otherwise unanimous hemispheric consensus which condemned the overthrow of a
democratically elected leader.[29] Upon his return to Miraflores, Chavez commenced
making accusations that the U.S. was behind both the coup and an alleged assassination
attempt against him that had occurred four months prior.[30] 
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It was clear that Bush and Chavez were not going to have an amicable relationship, and it
appeared as if the Bush administration had never wanted one in the first place. After the
coup, it was acknowledged that, months prior, a group of senior members of the Bush
administration and U.S. military leaders met with members of an anti-Chavez opposition
party in Washington D.C.[31] According to the U.S. officials, the U.S. members present in the
talks did not encourage a coup, but rather urged the opposition group to utilize the
constitutional process to remove Chavez from power.[32] In an effort to emphasize the
innocent hand the U.S. played in the coup, one senior official of the Bush administration
stated, “We didn’t even wink.”[33] However, a statement from a Department of Defense
official left more room for interpretation: “We were not discouraging people…We were
sending informal, subtle signals that we don't like this guy [Chavez]…We didn't say, 'No,
don't you dare,' and we weren't advocates saying, 'Here's some arms; we'll help you
overthrow this guy.' We were not doing that.''[34]  Responses such as the previous two were
not enough to placate furious rights groups and Latin American diplomats, who accused the
U.S. of turning a blind eye to the coup.[35] In essence, the lack of U.S. advisors in, arms
provided for, or explicit endorsement of the coup was not enough to claim that the U.S. did
not have a role. The U.S. fingerprints were on the design, and this evidence in combination
with the historical record of U.S. intervention in Latin America was ample proof to Chavez
that the U.S. was an existential threat to his administration.
The reasons behind this new U.S. hostility toward Chavez can best be described as a
byproduct of the Bush Doctrine in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but the benefit
such an aggressive strategy would have towards U.S. foreign policy and security in Latin
America is still unclear. According to political scientist and Latin American specialist Gary
Prevost, the Bush doctrine permitted “a preemptive war against potential aggressors before
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they are capable of mounting an attack against the United States.”[36] Prior to the coup,
Chavez had been critical of the U.S. and had also assumed a “pro-Cuban stance.”[37] Both of
these aforementioned provocations would have been irritating to the U.S. However, neither
action indicated that there was a risk of attack perpetrated or supported by Venezuela on
the U.S. that would have merited preemptive action supported by the Bush Doctrine.[38]
Additionally, if the U.S. wanted to silence Chavez’s criticisms to improve Latin American
perception of the U.S., then the meeting had quite the opposite effect since it brought
condemnation from regional partners.[39] An economic argument also seems weak, given
the fact that Venezuela was the “third-largest foreign supplier of U.S. oil” and Chavez had
not yet threatened this trade relationship.[40] Finally, the argument that Chavez was
undermining democracy also seems porous, as Chavez had won the presidency in elections
that were declared to be fully legitimate by international observers.[41]
Image from the 2002 coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (Telesur)
Ultimately, the coup of 2002 was the seminal event that led to the collapse of U.S.
Venezuelan relations through present day. After 2002, U.S.-Venezuelan relations worsened.
[42] Eventually, plummeting oil prices and increasing paranoia of further insurrection would
lead Chavez to take draconian economic and social measures that would cause Venezuela’s
economic collapse and give rise to Orwellian state controls of society.[43]
It is important to mention that there could be a very valid argument the Bush administration
had for the meeting with the anti-Chavez officials and for America’s unsympathetic
response to the coup. Documents from this era have yet to be declassified and not all
knowledge may be accessible in the public domain. If, in fact, Chavez had been harboring
terrorists or did pose some credible threat to U.S. security, then the Bush administration’s
response may have been warranted.
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The existence of a valid counter-argument would not change the three important lessons
learned from the Clinton-Bush era. First, any amount of government interaction with foreign
actors is an extension of a state’s foreign policy, as interaction signals bias. Both Castro-
Llanes’ contributions to Clinton’s campaign and the Bush administration’s meetings with the
anti-Chavez representatives signaled discord between the administrations of both U.S.
presidents and Chavez. Second, the historical memory of U.S. intervention in Latin America
is strong in the minds of Latin American leaders. This explains why any involvement the U.S.
had in supporting a coup was regarded with the utmost gravity by the regional powers.
Third, in Latin America it is not possible for the U.S. to partially back a coup. Any level of U.S.
involvement will be viewed as culpability. Hence, the choice to support a Latin American
coup is binary: completely desist or commit to the coup ready to accept the potential
international backlash that results. The latter option does not guarantee the
accomplishment of larger U.S. political objectives—as was demonstrated by the failed Bay of
Pigs invasion of Cuba.[44]
An analysis of U.S.-Venezuelan relations through the Clinton and Bush administrations
reveals that anti-Chavez bias was present in both administrations. However, during the
2002 coup against Chavez, the Bush administration kept its anti-Chavez bias but did not
want to accept responsibility for backing the coup. The result of this strategic waffling was
the meeting with the anti-Chavez representatives that yielded neither longer term decisive
change in Venezuelan politics nor a verisimilitude of U.S. neutrality. Furthermore, no
evidence is available in the public domain to prove that the U.S. had a strategic objective in
supporting the coup. Hence, in the case of the 2002 coup, it is highly likely that self-restraint
and neutrality would have provided greater utility to the U.S over the long term. However, if
there was a credible threat during this time period, then a more forceful response should
have been applied to ensure the complete permanent incapacitation of the Chavez regime
—to weakly back an overthrow only increases the likelihood of failure and the inheritance of
a more resolute enemy. Going forward, the U.S. should take heed to understand how
qualities of temperance, diplomatic tact, and moderation can yield far more productive
relationships in Latin America, but if national U.S. consensus chooses to eschew the
aforementioned qualities for more belligerent ones, such as a backing a coup, then the U.S.
should understand how Latin American historical memory magnifies the consequences and
execute a decisive strategy around this understanding.
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